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COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW REFORM.
L. L. BOMBERGER*
In embarking upon a study of the report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, one must be willing to abandon some of the conventionalities to which we
have been accustomed for generations. That, after all, is
the spirit of the new Federal rules and is one that certainly
commends itself to the litigant whose interests are at stake.
In the main the Committee's recommendations follow
the Federal rules. There are some departures, but a study
of these variances will lead to a conviction, it is believed,
that they tend somewhat to simplification.
Appellate Procedure begins with a fair presentation of
the question in the trial court. The machinery set up for
obtaining a review of an adverse decision should be simple
and efficacious. While it should be cast in a well defined
pattern, it should be free, if possible, from technicalities and
procedural pitfalls.
The first recommendation of the Committee is that bills
of exception be retained. This is maintaining some of the
formality that has been abandoned in the Federal rules under which the evidence is not incorporated into a bill of exceptions, but the reporter's transcript is filed and sent up
by the clerk to the Circuit Court of Appeals, in most cases
without having it brought to the attention of the trial judge.
There is one feature of the Federal rule 75 (h), however,
which might well be incorporated into the Indiana practice.
It is entirely possible for errors or omissions to creep into
a bill of exceptions even after the most careful scrutiny by
the reporter and counsel. Serious complications or even fatality may result from such error or omission, and therefore
it seems only reasonable that the trial court should be vested
with authority to make corrections "on a proper suggestion
or of its own initiative" and cause the corrected record to
be transmitted to the court of appeal. Occasions to apply
this rule will be comparatively rare but probably extremely
* Of the Hammond bar. Former president, The Indiana State Bar As-
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critical. It can hardly be assumed that lawyers will be less
diligent, relying upon the protection of this rule, in endeavoring to have their bills of exception correct in the first
instance.
The second recommendation is to abolish assignments
of errors, and the third, to abolish the motion for new trial.
These may be discussed together. The Committee objects to
carrying on the traditional burden of naming everybody to
the record in a paper called Assignment of Errors. This instrument is archaic as it is used in Indiana. Long ago some
judge on appeal conceived the idea of treating the cause
in the court of appeal as a new case, and, reasoning from
that, that the assignment of errors is the complaint. Of
course, if this principle is sound this conclusion is fair enough,
but no modern authority treats an appeal as a separate lawsuit. It is nothing more or less than an additional step in
the original case. There is no more occasion for naming all
the parties in some paper in the Appellate Court than there
would be for re-naming them all over again when filing an
answer or any other pleading except the complaint or amendments thereto.
Roscoe Pound, in his very late work entitled "Appellate
Procedure in Civil Cases," states the whole case in this language: "A case goes up on appeal and the parties go with it."
Assignments of error have been abolished in the Federal
courts except insofar as the instrument is used merely to indicate that less than the whole record will be taken up. In
appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals it is designated as
Statement of Points. Rule 75(d).
It is the Statement of Points provided for in Rule 75(d)
that can take the place of the motion for new trial and the
assignment of errors. In fact, it does so in the Federal practice. A motion for new trial is not in the chain of procedure
to take an appeal. About all it amounts to is to delay proceedings while it is pending and undisposed of in the district
court. There can be no substantial objection to having one
paper take the place of two.
The proposal of the Committee is that within twenty
days after verdict or decision a statement of all errors alleged to have occurred at any time from the inception of the
case shall be filed in the trial court. At the threshold let
us note that this will at once eliminate the perplexing prob-
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len that lawyers frequently confront in attempting to determine whether a certain error is to be presented by the motion for new trial, or must be treated as an independent
error and made the basis of an assignment of error on appeal. Cases are constantly coming down from reviewing
courts in which lawyers have been mistaken on this particular
point. It will no longer be a matter of concern and it should
not be. There is no good reason why the reviewing court
should be concerned with the manner of presenting the matter to the lower court. In fact, under the proposed rule all
alleged errors will be grouped into one instrument. This is
to be filed and called to the attention of the trial court. It
may be very informal in form. In fact, it would be sufficient
to say that "the following errors are alleged to have occurred
in the proceedings in this cause and will be presented for
review on appeal if an appeal is taken." They can then be
enumerated and will include rulings on pleadings, introduction
of evidence, the charge to the jury, and everything else that
the aggrieved party thinks should be presented to a reviewing court. The present requirements as to the presentation
of questions in the motion for new trial can readily be continued as to the statement of errors. The trial judge may
consider this instrument as equivalent to a motion for new
trial. If he is convinced that there are reversible errors in
the statement of errors lodged in his court, he may grant a
new trial, but he must do so within thirty days.
Here another departure from the traditional procedure is
introduced. Instead of allowing the trial judge to hold up a
motion indefinitely, as it is sometimes done very grievously
to the parties, it is automatically out of the trial court at
the end of thirty days unless a new trial is granted in the
interim. It is strongly urged that this departure alone will
be a great boon to the people whose interests are tied up in
the courts. They have a right to minimize the delay, and one
of the worst offenses of trial judges is in this respect.
There seems to be no limit upon the time that may be taken
to pass upon a motion for new trial, and the records show
that motions have been held up for several years in this state.
Of course, it goes without saying that no question which
has not been embodied in the statement of errors filed in
the trial court will be considered on appeal. The traditional
right of a trial judge, as we sometimes hear it said, to
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review his rulings, is strictly preserved by the method here
outlined. In that respect the proposals of the Committee
depart slightly from the Federal rules. In the United States
District Court the judge gets one opportunity, and only one,
to decide a question, if the losing party chooses his option
to appeal without filing a motion for new trial.
At this point it is appropriate to consider the 6th recommendation of the Committee, which is that the substance
of Rules 73, 74, 75 and 76 of the rules of procedure for
United States District Courts be adopted. These rules are
much simpler than a cursory reading might indicate.
Let it be assumed that the case has now reached the
point where the trial court has not acted upon the statement
of errors filed after the trial, and at the end of thirty days
the losing party is confronted with the alternative of abiding
by the judgment or taking his appeal. It is at this point that
the proposed Federal rules come in. Rule 73 requires simply
a Notice of Appeal filed in the district court. It is not
required in this notice to name all the parties on the record
but simply the parties taking the appeal and that part of the
judgment appealed from and the name of the court to which
it is taken. The clerk then has the responsibility of getting
this notice to the parties. This is entirely informal. 73(b).
Moreover, it is not jurisdictional and does not prejudice the appealing party. In fact, after the filing of the
Notice of Appeal failure of the appellant to take further steps
to secure review of the judgment does not affect the validity
of the appeal. 73(a).
Instead of having the trial court fix an appeal bond,
the rule fixes the bond at $250.00. 75(c) However, if proceedings are to be stayed, the appellant may be required to
present a supersedeas bond which is to be approved by the
judge. There are many cases, therefore, in which there will
be no supersedeas bond and the appeal bond of $250.00 is
ample.
Rule 73(f) injects a salutary provision by which the
surety on the appeal or supersedeas bond subjects himself
to the jurisdiction of the court and appoints the clerk as his
agent for service of any papers affecting his liability on the
bond, and that liability may be enforced without an independent action. Under the present practice in Indiana one may
be compelled to maintain two lawsuits, one to establish his
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rights, and the other to collect the money from a surety.
Rule 73 (g) requixes the docketing of the appeal within
forty days from the date of the Notice of Appeal. This may
be enlarged not to exceed ninety days. This is practically
the present rule in Indiana, except that it enlarges the preliminary time from thirty to forty days.
Having filed his Notice of Appeal and hi appeal bond,
the next step required on the appeal is to designate the parts
of the record which it is desired to use. That is, under the
Indiana practice one must now file a praecipe, but under the
Federal rules there is no serious risk taken as to how to
formulate a praecipe or that something important might be
omitted. This is another rock upon which numerous meritorious appeals have been wrecked in Indiana. It is highly
technical and nothing more or less in the last analysis than
a procedural pitfall. Certain parts of the record are automatically to be included whether called for in the praecipe
or not. Rule 75 (g).
This clause of Rule 75 is another instance of taking
drudgery off the appealing attorney. He knows that practically everything he wants is to be in the transcript whether
he calls for it or not. He can be giving his attention to the
merits of the case, where his attention belongs.
Rule 75(d) calls for a Statement of Points or Assignment of Errors where less than the full record is required.
This point is already in the Statement of Errors, used instead
of a motion for new trial and assignment of errors in the
reviewing court.
Rule 75(e) is worthy of attention because it calls for
an abbreviation of the record; it forbids repetition. It ought
to be sufficient to incorporate a document once and say at
the other places where it would appear that it is the same
document as appears at record so and so. The court can very
well adopt a rule or policy of treating this reference as verity
regardless of whether it is made by the trial judge in the
bill of exceptions or the clerk certifying the record. There is
authority for saying that the Supreme Court would so hold,'2
but the ultra-cautious lawyer may decline to take the risk.
It will be noted that not only does the rule forbid
a duplication of the instruments but it calls for an abridgment
1
2

Henry v. Thomas, Exee. 118 Ind. 23.
Sanders v. Farrell, 83 Ind. 28.
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as well. Where the appellant prepares a bill of exceptions
with an abridged lengthy instrument, using only such parts
as he deems pertinent, the appellee may call for such parts
as he feels are improperly omitted. Rule (75a).
It is firmly believed that the recommendations of the
Committee, if adopted, will very materially simplify the manner of taking an appeal. The question of the merits of the
appeal is another matter. There can be no machinery which
will assure an intelligent presentation of a case by an incompetent or careless lawyer. But the difficulty today is
that the machinery gets in the way of the capable lawyer
and prevents his concentration upon the questions involved
by too much emphasis upon the manner in which he shall
present them. The issues on appeal are much more important
than the procedural practice by which they are to be carried
up.
It is possible, as we know it is done in England, to
hear and dispose of appeals successfully and satisfactorily
without any formality, even without a brief. English litigants
get their cases heard without undue delay and with a minimum of procedural problems. There is no reason except
tradition which compels us to use more expensive and cumbersome methods. As to attaching exhibits to the transcript,
it will be noted that under the Federal practice, instead of
being put into a bill of exceptions, they are assembled by the
clerk below and transmitted with the record. When the oral
argument comes on, or at any other time, the judges having
the case under consideration may call for the exhibits and
examine them. They then go into the custody of the clerk
of the Appellate Court. Nobody suffers from this informality, and it should be adopted and encouraged in Indiana.
Rule 75(i).
There remains for consideration one further recommendation of the Committee. That involves an admonition to
Indiana lawyers to observe the spirit of the rule requiring
a summary of the record in appellant's brief. The Committee says: "We believe the purpose and spirit of the rule is
to have just enough of the record included in the brief to
present the question and not necessarily to include the testimony of all witnesses or print all exhibits." Here again most
lawyers are fearful of doing too little. So they commit the
opposite error of doing too much. Appellant should fairly
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be allowed to include in his summary of the abstract of the
record just what is necessary to present his question. This
will call, of course, for intelligent and skillful preparation.
If he is remiss in this task, or the appellee feels that to defend the judgment he must bring forward other parts of the
record not summarized by the appellant, he may do so. It
should not subject the appellant to the ultimate disaster of
dismissal or affirmance of his appeal because his judgment
differs from the appellee's in this respect.
The fourth recommendation is that the Supreme Court
adopt a rule to the effect that where an appellee files a motion to dismiss an appeal, the' time for filing his brief shall,
upon petition, be extended to a date thirty days beyond the
date of overruling the motion. As the rule now stands one
may be compelled to write a brief on the merits while his
motion to dismiss is pending. It has been suggested that
this proposed rule would encourage appellees to file motions
to dismiss not in good faith. A few disciplinary examples,
such as taxing costs or other rebuke to the appellee, would
probably eradicate this evil or hold it to a minimum. The
court can very well hold in such cases that in its judgment
the motion to dismiss is frivolous. It may be that the rule
should be amended by this qualification, that if the motion
is found to be frivolous the appellee may be ordered to file
his brief within five days of the overruling of the motion.
If one presented such a motion in bad faith he would probably
know it as well as the court and have the brief in readiness.
So that after all he would gain little, if any, time by the subterfuge.
The lawyer who wishes to use procedure for the purpose of entrapment or ambush will take little comfort from
the report. But certainly, the profession must take the broad
view and should subscribe to the creed which we have heard
before, which I conceive to be this:
A litigant has the right to have his cause presented by
a thoroughly trained lawer of integrity and ability, to an
impartial judge, capable of analysis and discrimination, and
prompt in his decisions, and an early review of the decision
by a court equally capable, unhampered by unnecessary procedural technicalities. The method and manner of presenting
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a cause must be completely subordinated to the ultimate objective. While the orderly processes of practice must be
observed, yet an appeal must not be paralyzed by a praecipe,
nor should a lawyer agonize over an assignment of errors.
The approval of this report at the Annual meeting will
be a forward step and encourage the Supreme Court to make
further improvements in the practice. Thus will be further
enhanced the high esteem which the Court has already attained among students of procedure by reason of its courageous use of its rule-making power.

